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L Introduction
In an attempt to ensure the fairness of the securities markets at a time when more
Americans than ever are investing,' the Supreme Court in United States v.
© 1998 Janet E. Kerr & Tor S. Sweeney
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; Luckman Distinguished Teaching
Fellow; J.D., Pepperdine University School of Law, 1978; LL.M., New York University, 1979. The
author served as staff attorney in the Division of Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange
Commission from 1978-81, and is a member of both the California and New York Bars. The author
would like to thank Deborah Collins and Matt Goldammer for their work on this article.
** B.A. 1994, University of California, Santa Barbara; J.D. Candidate 1998, Pepperdine University
School of Law.
1. See Donald Lambro, American Dream's Bull Market, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), June 30, 1997, at A 14.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
O'Hagan endorsed the validity of the "misappropriation theory" of securities fraud
liability3 under Rule 10b-54 of the Securities Exchange Act.5 Under the misap-
propriation theory, the government may criminally prosecute anyone who trades in
securities for personal profit using material, nonpublic information, in breach of a
fiduciary duty owed to the source of that information." The six-to-three decision in
favor of the misappropriation theory marks a departure from the hostility that the
Supreme Court has shown toward securities litigation in recent years.7 The decision
has provided the Securities and Exchange Commission with a powerful tool for
fighting the abuses of insider trading
O'Hagan, which involved a lawyer who misappropriated a client's material,
nonpublic information from his law firm, was an ideal case for the government to
take to the high Court to test the validity of the misappropriation theory." The $4.3
million profit James Herman O'Hagan realized"0 through his crime is indicative of
2. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
3. This Article will not address civil liability under the misappropriation theory. Instead, it will
focus solely on criminal liability with respect to section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 15 U.S.C. § 78a-7811 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995). The scope of
this Article is limited to the discussion of the O'Hagan Court's treatment of Rule lob-5. Accordingly,
this Article will not discuss the Court's decision regarding the application of Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. §
240.14e-3(a) (1997), a rule established by the SEC to regulate trading when there is a tender offer.
6. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207.
7. See generally Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164 (1994) (eliminating aider and abettor liability under section 10(b) for accountants, lawyers, and
investment bankers); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991)
(reducing the time for filing implied private claims under section 10(b)); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646
(1983) (dismissing a case involving an investment analyst who disseminated material, nonpublic
information); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (dismissing a case involving a printer who
traded on material, nonpublic information).
8. See Brett D. Frornson, Justices Spell Out Insider Trading: Any Misuse of Confidential
Information Is Illegal, Supreme Court Rules, WASH. PosT. (D.C.), June 26, 1997, at Cl. ("In the past
decade, nearly half of the 40 to 45 insider trading cases brought by the SEC's enforcement division each
year have been based in part on this legal [misappropriation] theory."); Telephone Interview with Arthur
F. Mathews, Counsel of Record, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering (July 7, 1997) (stating that the
misappropriation theory is an important tool for both SEC injunctive and civil relief).
9. See Dominic Bencivenga, The Right Set of Facts: O'Hagan Court Affirms SEC Rule-Making
Power, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 3, 1997, at 5 ("At least part of the government's victory is attributable to the fact
the SEC and Justice Department appealed O'Hagan, a case involving a lawyer who should have known
better, rather than the 1995 Fourth Circuit decision, United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 [(4th Cir.
1995)], which overturned the conviction of a West Virginia lottery commissioner that was based on the
misappropriation theory."); Telephone Interview with Arthur F. Mathews, Counsel of Record, Wilmer,
Cutler & Pickering (July 7, 1997) (stating that the Government waited for O'Hagan because it was such
a strong case for them because O'Hagan was an attorney that had a clear duty to his client).
10. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205 ("According to the indictment, O'Hagan used the profits he
gained through this trading to conceal his previous embezzlement and conversion of unrelated client trust
funds."); see also Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Knowing Naughty Information From Nice, WALL ST. J., July
22, 1997, at AI5 ("Mr. O'Hagan was found to have cheated one client, the Mayo Clinic, by settling a
malpractice case for $25,000 but telling the Mayo the amount was $225,000. He deposited the difference
in his own account, later explaining he felt the other lawyer had let the Mayo off too lightly.").
[Vol. 51:53
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol51/iss1/3
SCOPE OF THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
the type of capitalization from fraud involving nonpublic information that the
misappropriation theory is meant to target." The Supreme Court's decision to
uphold O'Hagan's lower court conviction based upon the misappropriation theory
has left the country with a theory of lOb-5 liability which leaves open more
questions than it answers.
One significant problem with the O'Hagan decision is that the test for liability is
too broad.' By approving a test for Rule lOb-5 liability in which virtually any
relationship can be a basis for liability, the Court has made it difficult for
individuals to understand the legality of their actions. Additionally, by upholding
the misappropriation theory, it appears that the Court is approving the various
rationales for liability the lower courts have accepted. In particular, the liability of
remote tippees under this rule leads to uncertain results. Although the decision
settles the question between the circuits as to the validity of the theory, it does not
address which relationships will be covered or how remote tippees are to be
handled.
The purpose of securities laws is to protect the integrity of the market.'3
Ensuring that investors cannot trade without risk preserves that integrity. But the
unclear standards of the misappropriation theory go beyond this purpose. Under the
misappropriation theory, individuals who undertake trades that involve risk may face
prosecution. 4 The result of the Court's endorsement of the misappropriation theory
is that both risk-free traders, as well as those who take a risk, face criminal liability.
Because O'Hagan provides little, if any, instruction with respect to this issue, it is
anticipated that the Court will be faced with this issue in the near future. This
Article suggests an alternative method of assessing liability under the misap-
propriation theory. If applied, this standard would more clearly define an
individual's liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
This article will examine the O'Hagan Court's opinion and the potential problems
arising out of the application of this decision to section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
liability. Part II looks at the evolution of lOb-5 liability including the history of the
federal securities laws, as well as both the classical and misappropriation theories.
Part III examines the history of insider trading and the development of the
misappropriation theory through the different circuits. Part IV analyzes the O'Hagan
decision and gives background to the Supreme Court's holding. Part V analyzes
potential problems with the O'Hagan Court's holding and proposes a three-prong test
for remedying the problems with the misappropriation theory.
1I. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209 ("The misappropriation theory targets information of a sort
that misappropriators ordinarily capitalize upon to gain no-risk profits through the purchase or sale of
securities.").
12. See supra note 3.
13. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209 ("The Exchange Act was enacted in part 'to ensure the
maintenance of fair and honest markets,' 15 U.S.C. § 78b, and there is no question that fraudulent uses
of confidential information fall within § 10(b)s prohibition if the fraud is 'in connection with' a securities
transaction.").
14. Even if a series of tippers and tippees were trying to pass along accurate inside information,
there is no guarantee that those communications would be accurate.
1998]
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II. The Evolution of lOb-5 Liability
A. Rule 1Ob-5 Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws"s
To combat the perceived abuses in the securities market which led to the stock
market crash of 1929 and the depression of the 1930s, Congress enacted a number
of regulatory laws aimed at promoting integrity and fairness in the securities
industry. 6 Congress emphasized full disclosure of information to investors, which
replaced the previous attitude of caveat emptor. 7 In addition, Congress created the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a federal agency with the duty of
carrying out those goals. 8
The two most important regulatory laws are the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities
Act) 9 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)." The Securities
Act regulates an issuer's registration and information disclosure when securities are
sold to the public. The Exchange Act governs the operation of securities trading.
More specifically, the Securities Act was passed with the intention of preventing
fraud and insufficient information in conjunction with an initial offer or sale of
securities.2' The Exchange Act, which has the same purpose, regulates securities
trading and prohibits manipulation and fraud in the secondary market.' Section
10(b)' of the Exchange Act expressly "prohibits the use "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security ... [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe."'"4
In 1942, pursuant to the SEC's authority under section 10(b), the SEC promul-
gated Rule 10b-5. This rule has since been expanded such that it has been termed
15. This section only discusses the statutory development of the federal securities laws. It will not
address the case law with respect to this.
16. See Central Bank of Denver, N.A., v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 170-
71(1994).
17. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972).
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(d) (1994 & Supp. 11995).
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77l (1994 & Supp. 1 1995).
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995).
21. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752 (1975).
22. See id.
23. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act states the following:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange -
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994).
24. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225 (1980) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 780) (1994)).
25. See id. Rule lob-5 of the Exchange Act provides:
[Vol. 51:53
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the "catch-all" provision for fraud.' Congress has not yet defined the term "insider
trading,"'27 nor has it delineated when such types of trading are not permissible. As
a result of the broad language of both section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, different courts
have applied one of two theories in the determination of liability for insider
trading.' These two theories, termed the "classical" or "traditional" theory
(hereinafter "classical theory") and the "misappropriation" theory, are the foundation
of this Article. The O'Hagan decision ultimately settles the question as to the
validity of the misappropriation theory.
B. Case Law Defining the "Classical Theory" of Insider Trading
Under the classical theory, liability under Rule lOb-5 is based upon common law
notions of fraud." At common law, fraud can be found were there was silence
regarding facts unavailable to another party and the silent party had a duty to speak
arising out of a special relationship.' Under the classical theory, "insiders" have
such a duty to speak. "Insiders" can be defined as directors, officers, or controlling
shareholders3' with access to material, nonpublic corporate information by virtue
of their positions. 2
This liability was extended to individuals other than corporate insiders in In re
Cady, Roberts & Co.33 This case involved the duties of a broker after receiving
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
26. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234-35; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976).
27. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376,98 Stat. 1264 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78a (1994)). Congress has developed penalties for those involved in illegal insider trading. However,
it has not drawn a distinct line with respect to the types of trading that can be considered illegal.
28. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228-29; see also United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207
(1997) ("The two theories are complementary, each addressing efforts to capitalize on nonpublic
information through the purchase or sale of securities.").
29. See Barbara Bader Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading on
Nonpublic Information, 13 HOP5TRA L. REV. 101, 112-14 (1984) (discussing the influence of common
law fraud in the development of Rule lOb-5).
30. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230.
31. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
32. See id. at 913-14. The holding in this case is the genesis of the "disclose or abstain" rule. The
SEC held that a partner in a securities firm who traded on nonpublic information willfully violated
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. See idL The SEC held that the partner was an insider who took advantage
of his access to corporate information and thus committed fraud on the person who sold him stock by
not disclosing this information. See id.
33. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
1998]
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nonpublic information from a corporate director as to a company's dividend
action . ' The Cady, Roberts duty provided that any person enjoying a "relationship
giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for
a corporate purpose," is presumed to have a fiduciary relationship of trust and
confidence with the shareholders.3 A person in this type of relationship has a duty
to disclose the confidential information prior to trading or to abstain from trading
on this information altogether." The court in Cady, Roberts deemed the broker to
be an insider even though he was not a director, officer or controlling shareholder
and reasoned that as an insider, the broker should have disclosed or abstained.37
The Second Circuit, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,3  extended the "disclose
or abstain rule" as defined by the Cady, Roberts court. In Texas 'Gulf, a number of
directors and officers, as well as other insiders, of Texas Gulf Sulfur Co. obtained
access to confidential information regarding certain drills the company had
conducted in Canada. 9 These individuals, based on this confidential information,
purchased the company's stock, as well as informed others without access to this
information, who subsequently made trades themselves. The court found the
disclose or abstain rule as advocated by the court in Cady, Roberts to be valid and
held that this duty arises under "those situations which are essentially extraordinary
in nature and which are reasonably certain to have a substantial effect on the market
price of the security if disclosed."'" The court reasoned that unequal access to
knowledge regarding important facts about a company's future would have a
significant negative impact on the market 2 The Cady, Roberts court found the
nature of the information being traded upon, as opposed to how the information was
obtained, to be most relevant 3
The nature of the relationships that give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain were
defined in Chiarella v. United States,;" a case that formed the foundation of insider
trading under the classical theory. In Chiarella, the petitioner, a "markup man" at
a printing company, was handling documents announcing corporate takeover bids
and, despite the fact that the names of the target companies were concealed, he was
able to deduce the names from other information contained in the documents.4 s
The Chiarella Court narrowed the holding in Cady, Roberts to require a breach of
34. See id at 914.
35. Id. at 912.
36. See id.; supra note 32 and accompanying text.
37. See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
38. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
39. See id. at 839-40.
40. See id
41. Id. at 848 (quoting Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Securities Trading and Corporate Information
Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1289 (1965)),
42. See id. at 852.
43. See id. at 849. To assess materiality, the Texas Gulf court held that one must look to whether
a reasonable person would find the information to be important in making the determination of whether
to purchase or sell securities in a company. See id.
44. 445 U.S 222, 235 (1980).
45. See id. at 224.
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a fiduciary duty or similar relationship of trust and confidence by a "person in
whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence" to support liability. The
Court found liable only those individuals who bought or sold securities on the basis
of material, nonpublic information in breach of a duty to the shareholders of the
corporation whose securities were being traded.47 The Court stated that a duty to
disclose or abstain does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic infor-
mation48 and the Court limited this duty only to corporate insiders.4 The markup
man in Chiarella, who had no prior dealings nor any other relationship with the
shareholders of the target corporation, therefore did not owe a duty to disclose or
abstain and, accordingly, his trades did not constitute fraud."
Dirks v. SEC" reaffirmed the holding in Chiarella with respect to the disclose
or abstain rule, in addition to applying Rule lOb-5 in situations where tippees traded
on material, nonpublic information.' Raymond Dirks, an officer of Delafield
Childs Inc., was informed by a former officer of Bankers National, which had
recently been acquired by Equity Funding of America, that Equity Funding had
vastly overstated its assets.' The asset overstatement was a result of a number of
fraudulent corporate practices.' Following this disclosure of information, Dirks
flew to Los Angeles to investigate the situation." Dirks remained in contact with
investors and analysts, both in an attempt to uncover additional information and to
notify both clients and potential clients of the situation.'M Dirks also attempted to
contact the Wall Street Journal. However, the Los Angeles bureau chief did not
believe the story.' Before the New York Stock Exchange could halt trading on
Equity Funding stock, several investors, as a result of speaking with Dirks, had
already sold more than $16 million of stock." Despite Dirk's attempts to uncover
and expose Equity Funding's fraud, the SEC charged and convicted him of violating
the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.9
46. Id. at 232 (stating that insiders have more access and greater knowledge with respect to the
company for which they are employed, and thus must primarily take into consideration the welfare of
these ordinary shareholder).
47. See id. at 233-35. The Chiarella Court appears to be limiting the standard established in Cady,
Roberts. The rationale is that applying a broad duty between all participants in the securities market goes
far beyond the standard established under the classical approach to Rule lOb-5, whereby a duty only
arises from a specific relationship between two parties. Id.
48. See id. at 235.
49. See id. at 227-28. Corporate insider status is found where one has obtained confidential
information by reason of a position within the corporation for which one is employed. See id. at 228.
50. See id. at 232.
51. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
52. See id. at 653-54.
53. See id. at 648-49.
54. See id. at 649.
55. See id.
56. See hL
57. See id. at 649-50.
58. See id. at 649.
59. See id. at 650-51.
19981
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The Dirks Court acknowledged that the nature of the securities market, as well
as information dealing with the market, leads to knowledge of certain information
by some individuals that is not equally available to all the public generally.' The
Court reasoned, however, that it would be virtually impossible for all traders to
enjoy equal information regarding securities prior to trading in the securities
markets." Additionally, the Court pointed out that recipients of inside information
do not invariably acquire a right to freely trade on material, nonpublic infor-
mation. 2 In essence, a balance between the two was desired. The Dirks Court
attempted to balance these dual interests by finding liability for tippees if the
individual knew or should have known, based on the type of information, that the
information received constituted a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty.'
According to the Dirks Court, an ordinary tippee has no independent fiduciary
duty to the corporation and its shareholders." The SEC based its theory of tippee
liability on the notion that the antifraud provisions require equal information be
available to all traders.' However, enforcing a rule whereby it is necessary to
disclose or abstain following the receipt of any material, nonpublic information
would serve to inhibit market analysts as well as the market itself.' A tippee
violation can be interpreted as an indirect violation of the disclose or abstain rule
set out in Cady, Roberts and upheld in Chiarella.
Because Dirks was not given the information by another for his own personal
benefit, Dirks did not inherit a fiduciary duty to the shareholders.' Although Dirks
was not found liable, the Dirks decision served to expand the scope of insider
liability to tippees who facilitated a fraud through a failure to disclose or abstain
after an insider breached a fiduciary duty through the disclosure of the information
60. See id. at 659.
61. See id. at 657.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 660. In explaining the role of tippees with respect to Rule lOb-5 liability, the Court
stated that "some tippees must assume an insider's duty to the shareholders not because they receive
inside information, but rather because it has been made available to them improperly." Id.
64. See id. at 655 & n.14. The Court did not find an independent fiduciary duty for tippees like that
applied to insiders. Although information legitimately revealed to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer,
or consultant working for the corporation does not give rise to an insider relationship, these outsiders
may be deemed fiduciaries of the shareholders, thereby the status of "insider" may be imputed upon these
outsiders. This duty applies where the outsider has entered into a special confidential relationship giving
access to material, nonpublic information while working for the corporation. See id.
65. See id. at 657. The Court in Chiarella noted that the formulation of a rule whereby everyone
would be privy to all information equally would not be appropriate absent explicit evidence of such
intent by Congress. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980).
66. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658.
67. See id. at 661 (citing In re Investors Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 651 (1971) ("[T]ippee
responsibility must be related back to insider responsibility by a necessary finding that the tippee knew
the information was given to him in breach of a duty by a person having a special relationship to the
issuer not to disclose the information . . .
68. See id. at 666-67.
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to the tippee, and the tippee knew or should have known that there has been a
breach.69
The holdings in Chiarella and Dirks further defined liability under Rule 1Ob-5,
effectively rounding off some of the rough edges formed as a result of the broad
language in both section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. To summarize, the classical theory,
as interpreted by the Supreme Court, did not allow for a finding of liability for
insider trading under Rule lOb-5 unless the individual owed a fiduciary duty to the
corporation and its shareholders.7 The Dirks Court, in an attempt to enforce the
purpose of Rule lOb-5, expanded this limited application of fiduciary duties to
validate the imposition of liability upon a tippee who received information from an
insider in a corporation and knew or should have known that by disclosing the
information the tipper was breaching a fiduciary duty.7
Both Chiarella and Dirks served to expand the limits of insider trading liability
under the classical theory of Rule lOb-5. Additionally, these two cases form the
basis upon which the misappropriation theory rests. Chief Justice Burger's
dissenting opinion in Chiarella, first suggested the need for expansion of the
classical theory. Dirks pioneered this expansion by extending liability under the
disclose or abstain rule to tippees of insiders. Based upon these two cases and the
SEC's goal of protecting investors, the misappropriation theory has since been
addressed by a number of the circuits.
III. History of the Misappropriation Theory
The theory of misappropriation as a means of finding liability under Rule 10b-5
had its start in the early 1980s.n The classical or traditional theory was deemed
by a number of circuits to be an insufficient basis upon which the Courts could
effect the purposes of the SEC in its formulation of Rule lOb-5.' Chiarella limited
the scope of people who could be liable for trading on material, nonpublic
information to include only those who had a duty to disclose arising from "a
relationship of trust or confidence."'74 Chief Justice Burger, however, disagreed
with the majority in this case and stated that, according to his interpretation of
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, any person "who has misappropriated nonpublic
information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from
trading."75 The Chief Justice discussed his opinion that liability should be found
where any person is engaged in a fraudulent scheme in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities, and that the scope of those who could be found liable
should not be limited to merely "corporate insiders" or to those who inappropriately
69. See id. at 660.
70. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232.
71. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
72. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 15-19 (2d Cir. 1981)
73. See infra note 79.
74. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980).
75. Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
19981
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traded on "corporate information."'76 Burger posited that section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 were meant to aid in the maximization of equality and fairness and
minimization of disparate knowledge among investors." This dissent served as the
catalyst for the development of the misappropriation theory.
The Dirks Court, in addition to imposing a duty to disclose or abstain on tippees,
also appeared to support the misappropriation theory. The Court's endorsement of
the misappropriation theory is evidenced in a footnote in the decision stating the
following:
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is
revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consul-
tant working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries
of the shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not
simply that such persons acquired nonpublic, corporate information, but
rather that they have entered into a special, confidential relationship in
the conduct of business of the enterprise and are given access to
information solely for corporate purposes."
Many courts have taken into account Chief Justice Berger's dissenting opinion in
Chiarella, as well as the implied endorsement of the misappropriation theory in
Dirks, to broaden the narrow application of section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 and apply
the misappropriation theory in varied forms. These coutts have utilized the
misappropriation theory as a tool by which to promote fairness and equitability in
the securities industry. 9
Under the misappropriation theory, criminal liability can be imposed upon an
individual who (1) misappropriates confidential information (2) in breach of any
duty arising out of a relationship of trust and confidence and (3) uses the
confidential information in a securities transaction.' The misappropriation theory
extends the reach of Rule 10b-5 to outsiders who would not ordinarily be deemed
fiduciaries of the corporate entities in whose stock they trade."' Accordingly,
liability would be extended to anyone who breaches a fiduciary duty to any lawful
possessor of material nonpublic information.' To understand the impact of the
O'Hagan decision, it is important to analyze the development of the misap-
propriation theory through the circuits.
76. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
77. See id. at 241 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
78. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
79. The first circuit which essentially adopted the misappropriation theory was the Second Circuit.
See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 15-19 (2d Cir. 1981). The Ninth and Seventh Circuits later
applied a misappropriation theory similar to that initially applied in the Second Circuit. See SEC v. Maio,
51 F.3d 623, 633-35 (7th Cir. 1995); SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark,
915 F.2d 439, 444-48 (9th Cir. 1990).
80. The theory behind liability for misappropriation is laid out in Chief Justice Burger's dissenting
opinion in Chiarella. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 239-45 (1980) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
81. See SEC v. Cherif, 993 F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1991).
82. See id.
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A. The Second Circuit
In 1981, the Second Circuit in United States v. Newman' was the first circuit
to adopt the misappropriation theory.&' In Newman, two employees of a New York
brokerage firm misappropriated confidential information entrusted to their employers
regarding certain mergers and acquisitions, and subsequently conveyed this
information to Newman.' Newman, as well as three other individuals with whom
he shared this information, purchased stock in the target company. All who traded
on this information made large sums of money after public announcement of the
mergers."
The Newman Court decided that, even though Newman committed no fraud
against the person from whom he was buying stock, his conduct constituted a
criminal violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.' Such liability was found in
spite of the fact that neither the New York brokerage firm nor its client was a
purchaser or seller of the target company's securities.88 Newman was convicted
irrespective of the fact that he did not commit fraud on a purchaser or seller of
securities.
Two years later, the Second Circuit rejected the misappropriation theory in Moss
v. Morgan Stanley,' a case involving a private right of action with the same facts
as Newman.' The Moss court, interpreting the Chiarella and Dirks Courts'
comments on the issue of misappropriation, found that section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
are meant to protect investors against fraud but are not intended to remedy all
situations where there is undesirable conduct involving securities." The court
found that the defendants did not have a duty to disclose or abstain with respect to
Moss and committed no fraud in purchasing shares of stock.' The court held that
Moss' suit based on the misappropriation theory contradicted Supreme Court
precedent and failed to state a valid section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 cause of action 3
83. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
84. See id. at 15-19.
85. See id. at 15. Newman was a securities trader and manager of the over-the-counter trading
department of a New York brokerage firm. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 16.
88. See id. These holdings are consistent with the language expressed in Rule lOb-5, which does
not contain any explicit requirements that fraud be perpetrated on either the seller or buyer of securities.
See id. at 17.
89. 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983). Moss was a shareholder of Morgan Stanley who sold his shares in
one of the target companies in which Newman had purchased stock based upon information supplied by
insiders of Morgan Stanley. See id. at 8. Moss sought to recover damages from Newman for his
violation of section 10(b) and Rule IOb-5, as well as from Morgan Stanley under the theory of derivative
liability stemming from the wrongdoing of one of the defendants who misappropriated the information.
See id. at 8-9.
90. See id. at 16.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
1998]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
In 1984, one year after the Moss decision, the Second Circuit upheld the
misappropriation theory in SEC v. Materia.' Materia was employed by Bowne
Inc., a financial printer, as a "copyholder" to proofread drafts of financial
documents." Despite the fact that the names of four tender offer targets had been
omitted from the documents, and despite Bowne's efforts to maintain complete
confidentiality for its clients, Materia was able to identify the four companies.'
Materia subsequently purchased stock in the target companies prior to the tender
offers being publicly announced, resulting in significant gains for Materia.'
Although Materia did not contest the finding that he misappropriated and traded
on confidential information for his own betterment, he did argue that trading on
information uncovered while on the job did not constitute a finding of fraud under
section 10(b) or Rule 10-b5." The court, however, found that Materia's act of
misappropriating material, nonpublic information fell under the requirements of
"fraud or deceit" found in the language of Rule lOb-5.? The court reasoned that
Materia acted fraudulently when he stole the information and likened this act to
converting the corporation's funds for personal gain." Materia also argued that
he could not have defrauded his employer due to his lack of knowledge of the
confidentiality of his work.' The court held that Bowne made sufficient attempts
to express the need for confidentiality with respect to a client's confidential
information." The court also found that, despite the fact that Materia could not
be considered a traditional insider with historically no duty to disclose or abstain,
he was still in violation of the misappropriation theory." The Materia court held
that "one who misappropriates nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary duty
and trades on that information to his own advantage violates section 10(b) and Rule
10b_5.,'10
Not long after Materia, a district court within the Second Circuit decided SEC v.
Musella"s The Musella court applied a similar rationale to that applied in
Materia, reasoning that trading on improperly obtained information, irrespective of
its source, is fundamentally unfair.'" In Musella, individuals who were not directly
involved in any confidential relationship were given tips regarding a company from
94. 745 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1984).
95. See id. at 199.
96. See id. Bowne, Inc. had an explicit policy that was posted throughout the plant as well as
disseminated to individual employees regarding the firm's prohibition of employee trades based on
confidential information found in the course of any work-related activities. See id. at 199 n.l.
97. See id. at 199.
98. See id. at 201.
99. See id.
100. See Materia. 745 F.2d at 201-02.
101. See id. at 202.
102. See id.; supra note 96 and accompanying text.
103. See Materia, 745 F.2d at 203.
104. Id.
105. 678 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
106. SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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an employee of a law firm that was representing that company in a tender offer."°
The court imposed liability on the individuals who had been given information upon
which they traded, even though they did not know the source from which the
information originated."' The court held that a tippee who trades is liable if he
knew or should have known that the information was improperly obtained."m
The Second Circuit, in Carpenter v. United States,"' looked at the issue
regarding the misappropriation theory once again. In this case, the defendants used
information gleaned from the employer of one of the defendants as a basis for
purchasing and selling securities."' The trial court held,"' and the Second Circuit
ultimately affirmed, that the misappropriation theory, when applied to the case at
bar, resulted in a finding of liability stemming from a breach of confidentiality owed
to the employer."' These defendants were found in violation of section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 despite the fact that the employer did not buy or sell securities."' The
Supreme Court, given the chance to address the issue of the misappropriation
theory, split four to four,"' giving little explanation with respect to the justification
for the decision."'
The question of what constitutes a fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and
confidence in the context of Rule lOb-5 under the misappropriation theory still
remained open to clarification. In United States v. Chestman,"' Loeb, a "remote
tippee," 8 shared with Chestman information gleaned from his wife (a member of
the Waldbaum family) regarding the stock of Waldbaum, a large supermarket
chain."9 Although the defendant claimed that he conducted his own research on
the stock, Chestman purchased shares of Waldbaum's stock for Loeb, himself, and
other clients following the receipt of the information from Loeb that the Waldbaum
stock was going to be sold at a "substantially higher" price than its market
107. See Musella, 678 F. Supp at 1061.
108. See id. at 1063.
109. See id. (citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660, 662 (1983)).
110. 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aftd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
111. See id. at 1026-27. This co-defendant had access to the insight of many corporate executives
with regard to the current affairs of the corporations for which they worked through his co-authorship
of a daily stock column published in the Wall Street Journal. See id. at 1026.
112. United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827, 838-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
113. See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1029-31.
114. See id.
115. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
116. The Court did not discuss the difference in opinions that divided the two sides, nor was there
any information given regarding which justices took which side of the argument.
117. See 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
118. A "remote tippee" is an individual who obtains confidential insider information from a tippee
beyond the original tip by the insider. See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION,
ENFORCEMENT & PREVENTION § 4.04(3), at 4-20 (1997).
119. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 555. Loeb's wife told Loeb with full knowledge that the information
she was sharing was material, nonpublic information. See id.
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value." In fact, Chestman doubled his money on this trade and was ultimately
convicted as a tippee of the information misappropriated by Loeb.
2
'
The Second Circuit, however, reversed Chestman's Rule lOb-5 convictions"n
and stated that "a fiduciary duty cannot be imposed unilaterally by entrusting a
person with confidential information."' " The court also stated that "the existence
of a confidential relationship must be determined independently of a preexisting
family relationship."' 4 The court decided that more is required to establish a
fiduciary relationship than telling a secret to a family member.' Where, however,
any fiduciary relationship was found to exist, the misappropriation theory could be
applied." The government's burden of proving that Loeb breached a fiduciary
duty to his wife and that Chestman had knowledge of this breach was not met.'"
The Second Circuit's restriction of the misappropriation theory was tested in the
case of United States v. Willis." Willis, a psychiatrist, was treating the wife of
Sanford Weill, a businessman involved in large transactions." Willis, in his
dealings with Mrs. Weill, learned that her husband was going to buy a bank. Willis
subsequently decided to purchase shares of the bank's stock and sold them later for
a substantial profit.'" Although Willis initially pled guilty, he withdrew his plea,
and based on the decision in Chestman, argued that there was no fiduciary duty
imposed on Mrs. Weill and that there must be an unbroken chain of confiden-
tiality.'
3
'
The court only looked to Willis' second argument, as it believed his first
argument had no merit.' In looking to the second argument, the court found the
important relationship to be between the misappropriator and the person to whom
the information was misappropriated, and distinguished this from the relationship
between the insider and the person with whom the insider shares the infor-
mation.' The court found a fiduciary relationship existed between Willis and
120. Id at 555.
121. See id. at 564.
122. See id. at 571.
123. Id. at 567.
124. Id. at 568. A fiduciary duty can be defined as "a duty to act for someone else's benefit, while
subordinating one's personal interest to that of the other person. It is the highest standard of duty implied
by law (e.g., trustee, guardian)." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990). The court in Chestman
noted that a "similar relationship of trust and confidence" cannot be interpreted to mean that marriage
alone is equivalent to a fiduciary relationship. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568.
125. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568.
126. See id. at 566. After Chestman, the misappropriation theory could be applied without the
requirement that the "buyer or seller of securities be defrauded" and could be applied to "fiduciary
breaches of any sort," thereby construing the "similar relationship of trust and confidence" requirement
very liberally. Id at 566-67.
127. See id. at 570.
128. 778 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
129. See United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). The most applicable case
in this series of Willis cases in Willis !,I; however, the facts of the case are taken from Willis L
130. See id.
131. See Willis, 778 F. Supp. at 208.
132. See id.
133. See id. In this decision, the court looked to the misappropriation theory's lack of a requirement
[Vol. 51:53
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol51/iss1/3
SCOPE OF THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
Mrs. Weill in connection with Willis' position as a psychiatrist.'" Because the
doctor-patient relationship can be deemed a fiduciary relationship, Willis had a duty
to either disclose the inside information or abstain from trading in the securities of
companies discussed incident to his position as a psychiatrist.'35
After the Chestman decision, the question of whether and under what conditions
the misappropriation theory can be applied in the context of a tipper-tippee fact
pattern remained unclear.3 This issue was addressed by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Libera37 In Libera, the defendant, a printer for Business Week,
utilized his access to copies of the magazine prior to publication to obtain
information upon which he traded.3 ' Libera was aware of his employer's strict
rules with respect to the confidentiality of any information that had not yet been
published.3
In Libera, the Second Circuit rejected the argument that a tipper has to have
knowledge that misappropriating the information in breach of a fiduciary duty will
lead to trading on that information thereby amounting to a violation of section
10(b)." The court determined that such a requirement would only serve as a
loophole for misappropriating information. 4' The court left unchanged the
elements of the misappropriation theory as espoused in Chestman, namely "(i) a
breach by the tipper of a duty owed to the owner of the nonpublic information; and
(ii) the tippee's knowledge that the tipper had breached the duty." 4
that the breach of duty be related directly to the corporation or its shareholders. See id.
134. See id. at 209.
135. See id. at 209.
136. In Chestman, the misappropriation theory was not applied because the tipper was found not
to have breached a duty to the source of the information. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551,
571 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc). The Chestman court opted to "tread cautiously in extending the
misappropriation theory to new relationships" in an effort to minimize the chance of allowing Rule lob-5
to become too all-encompassing. Id. at 567; see also supra notes 117-26 and accompanying text
(discussing Chestman).
137. 989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1993).
138. See id. at 598-99.
139. See id. Libera's awareness of the policy of keeping the information contained within the
magazine confidential prior to its Thursday, 5 p.m. release can be assumed based on the distribution of
a memorandum, as well as R.R. Donnelley & Sons' company-wide policies. See id.
140. See id. at 600. The Court expressed its concern in allowing a tippee to escape liability simply
because it was too difficult to prove to a jury that the tipper had knowledge of the exact misuse that
would result from his misappropriation and tip. See id.
141. See id.
142. Id. (citing United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 570 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc)). The court
reasoned that the tipper's knowledge that he was breaching a duty to the owner of confidential
information was sufficient to establish an expectation that the breach would lead to some kind of misuse
of the information. See Libera, 989 F.2d at 600. The court explained that the purposes of the
misappropriation theory in protecting property rights would not be met if the government were forced
to prove that a tipper had specific knowledge of the consequences of his or her breach. See id.
19981
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B. The Third Circuit
In 1985, the Third Circuit chose to adopt the misappropriation theory in Rothberg
v. Rosenbloom."3 In this case, Rosenbloom obtained information from an insider
of a target corporation regarding sales figures, which far surpassed the prior year's
figures.'" This information was subsequently communicated to Rothberg, with
whom the Rosenblooms joined to invest in the target company prior to public
disclosure of the outstanding sales figures.' The Third Circuit noted the defen-
dants' positions within the acquiring company and the breach of duty in disclosing
the insider information to their company. Citing United States v. Newman" as the
basis for its holding,47 the court made the outside misappropriator an "insider" by
virtue of his relationship to a corporation that was seeking to acquire the company
whose shares were traded. 4" Because the Third Circuit imposed a duty was
imposed beyond that owed to the purchasers and sellers of securities, its application
of the misappropriation theory has been viewed as a stretch. In fact, the court in
Rothberg merely referred to the theory in a single sentence of its holding, but did
not term it the "misappropriation theory."'49
C. The Fourth Circuit
The misappropriation theory was first rejected by the Fourth Circuit in United
States v. Bryan,' thereby limiting the theory's expansion into that circuit. In
Bryan, the defendant was the director of a state lottery who had access to
confidential, non-public information regarding a company that was going to be
awarded a lucrative government contract.'' Bryan subsequently used the misap-
propriated confidential information to purchase shares of that company.'
The Fourth Circuit invalidated the theory of misappropriation adopted by a
number of the circuits.'53 The Bryan court found it necessary to look beyond past
applications of the misappropriation theory in its determination of whether criminal
liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 could be found."t ' Following Supreme
Court precedent, the Bryan court held that the fraud element of Rule 10b-5 has to
143. 771 F.2d 818, 822-23 (3d Cir. 1985).
144. See id. at 820.
145. See id.
146. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
147. See Rothberg, 771 F.2d at 822-23; see also supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text
(discussing Newman).
148. See Wade M. Hall, Insider Trading Liability: Are We Ready to Leave the Misappropriation
Theory Quagmire?, 44 U. KAN. L. REv. 867, 878 (1996).
149. See Rothberg, 771 F.2d at 822; United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 n.5 (4th Cir. 1995).
150. 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
151. See id. at 937.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 944-49. The Court found that section 10(b), Rule lOb-5, and the interpretation of
these provisions by the Supreme Court do not sufficiently support a conviction under the misap-
propriation theory where there was no duty owed to the buyer or seller of securities. See id. at 944.
154. See id.
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be satisfied by a breach of a duty to disclose owed to the buyer or seller of
securities, which was greater than the standard requiring the fraud be "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security."' 5 The Fourth Circuit concluded that
its decision must be consistent with the Supreme Court's holdings in both Chiarella
and Dirks; otherwise, the ultimate result would be a "patchwork of criminal
standards" and a "federalization of relationships historically regulated by the
states."'' " The court believed that the adoption of the misappropriation theory
added further uncertainty to the laws governing fraudulent securities transactions' "
and held that misappropriating information from an individual who is in no way
connected to securities cannot be construed as conduct the SEC intended to
eliminate with the formation of these rules."5 8 The Bryan court's findings
demonstrate a rejection of the misappropriation theory. The court stated, however,
that unlawful transactions will be more appropriately policed by the classical theory
as espoused in the Chiarella and Dirks holdings.'"
The Fourth Circuit applied the so-called "Bryan test"'6" in United States v.
ReBrook. The ReBrook case was based on the same facts as those in Bryan.
ReBrook worked with Bryan as an attorney for the same state lottery." Bryan
gave ReBrook the information he had, and ReBrook subsequently purchased shares
in the company that was going to be awarded a government contract without
disclosing to the Lottery Commission the intent to make use of the information.'
ReBrook was initially convicted by the trial court of securities fraud.' 6 This was
later reversed when the court of appeals applied what it termed "straightforward
reasoning" in Bryan." The Fourth Circuit made it clear that they rejected the
misappropriation theory as envisioned by the other circuits entirely, not just as
applied to the particular facts in Bryan." Finding that ReBrook "simply took
advantage of the information to which he was privy," which was a similar action
155. lId at 959. The Court also looked to Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975), to support its findings that section 10(b) is primarily concerned with purchasers and sellers of
securities. See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 947.
156. I at 951. The Court found that the misappropriation theory is excessively broad in its
allowance of the imposition of liability upon "the mere breach of a fiduciary relationship or similar
relationship of trust and confidence." l at 949.
157. See id. at 952-53.
158. See iL at 949.
159. See id. at 953.
160. The "Bryan test" evaluates whether deception was used "in the form of material misrepresen-
tations or omissions, to induce action or inaction by purchasers or sellers of securities, or that affects
others with a vested interest in a securities transaction." United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961,966 (4th
Cir.) (citing United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995)).
161. 58 F.3d 961 (4th Cir. 1995); see also supra notes 150-59 and accompanying text (discussing
Bryan).
162. See ReBrook, 58 F.3d at 963.
163. See id at 964.
164. See United States v. ReBrook, 842 F. Supp. 891 (S.D. W. Va. 1994).
165. See ReBrook, 58 F.3d at 966.
166. See id
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taken by Bryan, the Fourth Circuit concluded that ReBrook's conviction for
securities fraud violations should be reversed. 7
D. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit grappled with and adopted the misappropriation theory in
SEC v. Cherif.'" Cherif, the defendant, was a former employee of a national bank
who gained access to inside information concerning tender offers and leveraged
buyouts with respect to the bank. Knowing of the bank's integrity policy, Cherif
fraudulently reactivated his employee magnetic identification card to obtain
information from the bank's finance department, and ultimately traded on the
information to which he gained access." Cherif hid the money in accounts, which
were opened in other people's names.7 '
The Seventh Circuit relied on the analysis from the Second Circuit holdings in
Newman, Materia, and Carpenter and "join[ed] these courts in holding that a person
violates Rule 10b-5 and section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by
misappropriating and trading upon material information entrusted to him by virtue
of a fiduciary relationship such as employment...' Cherif, however, argued that
he owed no fiduciary duty to the bank, as he was no longer an employee.'" The
court explained, however, that this relationship must continue to exist even
following termination."r Cherifs trades following his obtainment of the material,
nonpublic information related to potential deals were "in connection with" the entire
fraudulent scheme." Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's
finding that Cherif violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, noting that "[t]he
misappropriation theory focuses not on the insider's fiduciary duty to the issuing
company or its shareholders but on whether the insider breached a fiduciary duty
to any lawful possessor of nonpublic information."'7"
The Seventh Circuit further expanded its application of the misappropriation
theory in SEC v. Maio."76 In this case, Ferrero, the president, CEO, and chairman
of a large company told his friend, Maio, who in turn told a second friend, Ladavac,
that. this company was in the process of negotiating a tender offer for stock in
167. Id.
168. 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991).
169. See id. at 406. The bank's Specialized Finance Department provided financing for business
transactions including tender offers and leveraged buy:outs. See iL
170. See id. at 406-07.
171. Id. at 410.
172. See hit at 411.
173. See id. A broad common law duty obligates an employee, past or present, to protect
confidential information entrusted to the employee throughout the course of employment. See id.
174. hI.
175. Id. at 406. The court found that the breach of duty with respect to Cherif was not in the
acquisition of the information, but rather, was in the improper use of the access card, as well as the
bank's inside information, which were entrusted to Cherif through his fiduciary relationship prior to his
termination. See id. at 411.
176. 51 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995).
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another corporation." The tippees, Maio and Ladavac, then traded in the
corporation's stock, as well as the target's stock on the basis of this material,
nonpublic information.'7 Strong evidence existed with respect to Maio and
Ladavac's knowledge that Ferraro had violated his fiduciary duty to the corporation
by disclosing to the "tippees" that the corporation would be making a tender
offer."' Accordingly, the court imposed a derivative duty not to trade because,
although Ferraro breached his fiduciary duty to his company, Maio and Ladavac
knew this disclosure to be improper."
In this case, the court applied the test established in Dirks"' to extend the
misappropriation theory to the tippees of the misappropriator.'" The court
affirmed the holding in Dirks that a tippee has a "derivative duty not to trade on
material, nonpublic information when the disclosure of information is improper and
the tippee knows or should know that this is the case.""' Thus, the SEC could
extend insider trading liability to those who did not owe a fiduciary duty, but rather
had a "derivative duty" to the corporations involved in a tender offer where the
tippee "knew or should have known that the disclosure was improper. '
E. The Ninth Circuit
In 1990, six years after the decision in Materia, the Ninth Circuit, in SEC v.
Clark' held that the misappropriation theory extends to trading by outsiders."
In this case, Clark traded secretly on information that he knew was confidential.'
The Ninth Circuit examined whether Congress had granted the SEC the power to
create rules which encompass the misappropriation theory." 8 Citing the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,' the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984," and the
177. See id. at 626-27.
178. See id.
179. See iaL at 629.
180. See id. Maio and Ladavac, upon buying and selling shares in this company, as well as the
target company, without disclosing the material, nonpublic information in their possession, breached their
derivative duty to the company from which the information was derived. See id. at 637-38.
181. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983); supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
182. See Maio, 51 F.3d at 632. The court found that Maio had a derivative duty not to trade in the
company's stock on the basis of the material, nonpublic information provided by Ferrero if he knew or
should have known that Ferrero had provided this information in violation of his fiduciary duty his
company. See id. at 633; see also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 661 (citing In re Investors Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C.
633, 651 (1971)) ("[Tlippee responsibility must be related back to insider responsibility by a necessary
finding that the tippee knew the information was given to him in breach of a duty by a person having
a special relationship to the issuer not to disclose the information ....
183. Maio, 51 F.3d at 632 (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659-60).
184. ld. at 634.
185. 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
186. See id. at 443. In Clark, a co-officer of a company knowingly leaked confidential, nonpublic
information to Clark regarding a potential takeover. See id. at 441-42. Clark, in turn, purchased the target
company's stock and attempted to hide his purchases by making trades in the maiden name of his wife.
See id.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 443.
189. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995).
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Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988,"' the court found
that section 10(b) was meant to be broad." The Court found strong evidence that
the misappropriation theory falls within the meaning of fraud found in section 10(b)
and Rule l0b-5.'" Clark was found liable under Rule 10b-5, and was ultimately
forced to disgorge his profits as well as pay a fine.'"
IV. O'Hagan: Facts and Proceedings
A. The Facts
In July 1988, Gand Met PLC (Grand Met), a company based in London,
England, retained Dorsey & Whitney, a law firm based in Minneapolis, Minnesota,
to represent them as local counsel in preparation for the potential acquisition of the
Minneapolis-based Pillsbury Company (Pillsbury).195 Prior to the announcement
of Grand Met's tender offer, James Herman O'Hagan, a Dorsey & Whitney partner
who was not personally involved in representing Grand Met, began to purchase
Pillsbury securities.' By the time Grand Met publicly announced its tender offer
for Pillsbury in September, O'Hagan had purchased 2,500 call options and 5,000
shares of Pillsbury common stock." After the tender offer, the price of Pillsbury
stock rose to just under $60 per share, at which time O'Hagan sold both his call
options and his shares of common stock for a profit of more than $4.3 million.'
B. The Case in the Lower Court
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation of O'Hagan ended
in a fifty-seven-count indictment which included counts for securities fraud, mail
fraud, and money laundering.'" The securities fraud case against O'Hagan was
based on the misappropriation theory of liability for insider trading.'n The
"classical theory" of insider trading was unavailable to the SEC because O'Hagan
traded in Pillsbury securities, a company to which neither he nor his law firm owed
196. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376,98 Stat. 1264 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
191. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat.
4677 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
192. See Clark, 915 F.2d at 450. The court stated that the SEC's adoption of Rule lOb-5 was
intended to reach fraudulent acts beyond those committed on the purchaser or seller of securities. See
id. These rules were meant to protect public interest, and as such, could be interpreted broadly. See id.
193. See id. at 453.
194. See id. at 442.
195. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2205 (1997).
196. See iL
197. See id.
198. See id. Pillsbury stock rose from $39 a share to nearly $60 a share when the tender offer was
publicly announced. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 2206.
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a fiduciary duty."° Following a jury trial, O'Hagan was convicted on all fifty-
seven counts and sentenced to forty-one months of imprisonment.'
O'Hagan appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
arguing that the misappropriation theory was an impermissible basis on which to
impose liability under section 10(b)." The Eight Circuit, following the Fourth
Circuit's lead in United States v. Bryan,' agreed with O'Hagan and rejected the
misappropriation theory as a basis for section 10(b) liability.' ° The court noted
that, because O'Hagan's convictions for mail fraud and money laundering were
based on the securities law violations, they were forced to reverse and remand the
case to the district court for dismissal of the entire indictment.
The Eighth Circuit based its decision on two primary grounds. First, in looking
at section 10(b) itself, the court found that the language of the statute shows no
intention of Congress to prohibit any conduct other than manipulation or decep-
tion.20 The court concluded that because the misappropriation theory requires
neither misrepresentation nor nondisclosure, it fails to require "deception" as
delineated in section 10(b).' The court found that this failure to require deception
made the misappropriation theory an invalid means of determining section 10(b)
liability.' The court followed and relied upon the holdings in both Central Bank
of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.2"' and Santa Fe Industries,
201. See id. at 2208 n.5. The Court stated:
The Government could not have prosecuted O'Hagan under the classical theory, for O'Hagan was
not an "insider" of Pillsbury, the corporation in whose stock he traded. Although an "outsider"
with respect to Pillsbury, O'Hagan had an intimate association with, and was found to have traded
on confidential information from, Dorsey and Whitney, counsel to tender offeror Grand Met.
Id.
202. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 614 (1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2219 (1997).
203. See id.
204. 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that there is no fiduciary duty owed to one who is neither
a purchaser nor seller of securities, even when such a breach is followed by the purchase or sale of
securities). The Bryan Court went on to say that such conduct "simply does not constitute fraud in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities, within the meaning of section 10(b)." See id. at 952;
see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 n.5 (1975) ("Mhe wording of §
10(b), making fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security a violation of the Act, is surely
badly strained when construed to provide a cause of action, not to purchasers and sellers of securities,
but to the world at large.").
205. See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 614. The court emphasized that section 10(b) is meant to police the
fairness of securities transactions in general, as long as there is no evidence of deception in connection
with a securities transaction (in the form of material misrepresentations or omissions in connection with
the transaction). See id. at 615.
206. See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 627-28.
207. See id. at 616; see also Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977) ("The
language of § 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving
manipulation or deception. Nor have we been cited to any evidence in the legislative history that would
support a departure from the language of the statute.").
208. See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 618 ("The misappropriation theory runs counter to Santa Fe and
Central Bank holdings that the mere breach of a fiduciary obligation, without misrepresentation or
nondisclosure, is not deception within the meaning of § 10(b).").
209. See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 617.
210. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994). In Central Bank, the Court confirmed that neither misrepresentation
1998]
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Inc. v. Green1' in its rejection of the lower court's holdings and conclusion that
the misappropriation theory does not require "deception.2 12
Second, the court concluded that the misappropriation theory fails to meet section
10(b)'s requirement that the "deception" be "in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security."21'3 The court found that the misappropriation theory "permits
liability for a breach of a duty owed to individuals who are unconnected to and
perhaps uninterested in a securities transaction, thus rendering meaningless the 'in
connection with...' statutory language. 21 14 The court, in agreement with the
Bryan court, held that the Supreme Court intended section 10(b) to only protect
"purchasers and sellers of securities." ' 5 The court found the misappropriation
theory to be more of an expansive "general fraud-on-the-source theory," as opposed
to its intended purpose of governing and protecting relations among participants
within the market.216
C. The Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion written by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, disagreed with the Eighth Circuit and held that "criminal liability under
section 10(b) may be predicated on the misappropriation theory.""2 7 The Court
found that the misappropriation theory was both consistent with section 10(b) and
with the Court's precedent.2 8 The Court found that the misappropriation theory "is
also well-tuned to an animating purpose of the Exchange Act: to insure honest
securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence."2 "1 The O'Hagan
Court, in its decision, opened up liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for
any person who trades in securities for personal profit using material, nonpublic
information that was misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary duty to the source of
the information.
The Court began its analysis by examining whether the misappropriation theory
satisfies section 10(b)'s requirement that the chargeable conduct involve a
"deceptive device or contrivance" used in "connection with" the purchase or sale
or nondisclosure are requirements for liability under section 10(b). See id. at 1448.
211. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). In Sante Fe Industries, the Court explicitly rejected the lower court's
interpretation of section 10(b) which required no misrepresentation or nondisclosure. See id. at 470-76.
212. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 617-18.
213. Id. at 618.
214. Id. The Eight Circuit states that a "careful reading of the Supreme Court's decisions in
Chiarella, Dirks, and Central Bank reveals that only a breach of a duty to parties to the securities
transaction or, at the most, to other market participants such as investors, will be sufficient to give rise
to § 10(b) liability." Id.
215. Id. (citing United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 946-47 (4th Cir. 1995) ("The [Supreme] Court
has left no doubt that the principal concern of section 10(b) is the protection of purchasers and sellers
of securities.").
216. Id. at 619.
217. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2206 (1997).
218. See id. at 2213-14.
219. Id at 2210.
220. See id. at 2206-14.
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of securities.tm The Court stated that misappropriators "deal in deception. '
Quoting from the Government's brief, the Court stated: "A fiduciary who
[pretends] loyalty to the principal while secretly converting the principal's
information for personal gain 'dupes' or defrauds the principal."' Thus, when
O'Hagan failed to disclose that he was interested in trading on the tender offer
information, he was deceptive and breached a duty of trust to both Dorsey &
Whitney and Grand Met. The Court then went on to find that disclosure could
eliminate the issue of deception.' "Full disclosure forecloses liability under the
misappropriation theory," the Court explained.' The misappropriation theory
involves deception whereby one "dupes or defrauds"'t the source of the infor-
mation. Thus, "if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on
nonpublic information, there is no deceptive device and thus no section 10b
violation."'
Next, the Court looked at whether the misappropriation theory satisfies the section
10(b) requirement that the misappropriator's "deceptive use of information be 'in
connection with the purchase or sale of [a] security."'tm The Court concluded that
this element is satisfied when the misappropriator "uses the information to purchase
or sell securities" without telling his principals.' The Court makes clear that the
misappropriation theory deals not only with the unfairness or lack of disclosure to
the marketplace as a whole, but also with the injury that the source of the
information suffers.' 0 However, the Court pointed out that, although the misap-
propriation theory catches fraudulent means of capitalizing on such information
through securities transactions, it does not catch all conceivable forms of fraud
involving confidential information." Essentially, the misappropriation theory is
meant to be a means of attaching liability in the event that a person learns inside
information and secretly uses it to "gain no-risk profits.""
The Court stressed that persons can be prosecuted only for "willfully" violating
Rule lOb-5. 3 This stricter scienter requirement could serve to limit criminal
liability under the misappropriation theorytm Prosecutors must prove that the
221. See id. at 2208.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 2208 (citing Brief for United States at 17, United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199
(1997) (No. 96-842)); see also Aldave, supra note 29, at 119 (discussing how a misappropriator is guilty
of deceiving the party who put trust and confidence in him when that person conveys it to others or
trades on the basis of it).
224. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2208.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 2209 (citing Brief for United States at 17).
227. Id. at 2209.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 2214.
234. See id.
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misappropriator "willfully" violated the rule, and the defendants cannot be
imprisoned if there is proof that there was no knowledge of the rule."s This
safeguard is meant to ensure that an innocent and naYve person will not be wrongly
sent to prison for an honest mistake.
The Court also attempted to reconcile its decision in O'Hagan with its rationale
in the Chiarella, Dirks, and Central Bank holdings. In each of these cases, the
Court found that section 10(b) liability could not be found where a duty was not
owed to the source of nonpublic information.' In Chiarella, the Court found a
duty to disclose or abstain from trading "arises from a specific relationship between
two parties,"n7 and for this reason held that liability could not be imposed on the
defendant who had no agency or other fiduciary relationship with the sellers."
The Court in O'Hagan points out, however, that the Chiarella decision did not
imply that the only relationship which could amount to liability under the
misappropriation theory was one between corporate insiders and shareholders."
The O'Hagan Court then looked at the application of the misappropriation theory
in Dirks. In Dirks, the Court refused to apply the SEC's view that there was a duty
to refrain from communicating nonpublic information to anyone likely to trade
based on that information.2' The Court in Dirks found that no general duty
existed between all participants in all market transactions to suspend or forgo action
based on information that was both material and nonpublic." The Court noted
that the tippers in Dirks were not acting for personal profit, but rather to expose
fraud. Therefore, Dirks could not misappropriate the information because there was
no expectation that he would keep it in confidence. 2 The distinction in Dirks was
that there was no violation by the tippers, and thus no derivative liability could be
attributed to the tippee.2"
Finally, the Court looked to Central Bank's holding that a private plaintiff may
not bring an aiding and abetting suit under section 10(b).' The Court clarified
this holding by adding that, even though secondary actors, such as a lawyer,
accountant, or bank, are not subject to liability for aiding and abetting,2" these
actors may be subject to "primary liability under section 10(b) and Rule lb-5 for
235. See id. The Court explains: "To establish a criminal violation of Rule l0b-5, the Government
must prove that a person 'willfully' violated the provision. Furthermore, a defendant may not be
imprisoned for violating Rule lOb-5 if he proves that he had no knowledge of the rule." Id. (citing 15
U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1994)).
236. See id. at 2211.
237. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 223 (1980), quoted in O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2212.
238. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2211.
239. See id. at 2212.
240. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655-59 (1983).
241. See id. at 655 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233).
242. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2213.
243. See id. at 2213 (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655).
244. See id. (citing Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 551 U.S.
164, 191 (1994)).
245. See iL
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certain conduct."'2 Despite the fact that the aforementioned cases showed a
willingness to limit the scope of the application of the misappropriation theory, the
cases did not undermine the validity of the theory itself.
The Court, in the O'Hagan opinion, appears to be open to the assessment of
liability based upon the misappropriation theory for anyone, however remote from
the insider, who trades on information gleaned from a source to which some duty
is owed. The Court's definition of duty applies to any parties with a specific
relationship. The specific relationship is established by the act of exchanging the
material, nonpublic information prior to public dissemination of this information.
This relationship is broad and left open to anyone who is regularly entrusted with
the confidential information 47 There is no list or specific guideline specified by
the Court to determine what particular relationships give rise to a duty to disclose
or abstain. The Court appears to be leaving this definition broad so as not to limit
liability for individuals who misappropriated information and did not have a
traditional, definable fiduciary relationship.
In dissent,' Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist, stated that the misappropriation theory could not be upheld in this case
and could not be a basis upon which O'Hagan could be convicted2 9 Thomas
explained that his dissent is a result of the SEC's failure to provide a concise and
consistent interpretation of section 10(b)'s requirement that a deceptive device be
"use[d] or employ[ed], in connection with" the purchase or sale of any security.' 0
Thomas found the Commission's interpretation of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to
be inconsistent and lacking any predictable guidance as to what behavior amounts
to liability under the statuteY'
V. The Impact of O'Hagan and the Search for an Appropriate Standard
A. Relationships and Remote Tippees Under O'Hagan
The Court in O'Hagan adopted an open-ended test of Rule lOb-5 liability. The
decision permits a finding of liability for any individual who has some "duty of
confidentiality" to the source. While there is no question that accountants,
lawyers, and investment bankers in a position of trust who learn about a pending
takeover should not abuse their position, individuals outside a traditional fiduciary
246. Id.
247. See id. at 2207.
248. Justice Scalia concurred in part and dissented in part with a separate opinion. Scalia discussed,
among other things, the application of the principle of lenity to criminal statutes. Scalia stated that "in
light of [the lenity principle], it seems to me that the unelaborated statutory language: '[t]o use or employ
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance,' § 10(b) must be construed to require the manipulation or deception of a party to a securities
transaction." Id. at 2220 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
249. See id. at 2224 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
250. See id. at 2222 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
25 1. See id. at 2226 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 2219.
1998]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
relationship also face prosecution under the current misappropriation theory."3
These individuals often lack the professional obligation of trust that traditional
fiduciaries have. The test that the Supreme Court has chosen to affirm would
expand liability with respect to those individuals outside of traditional fiduciary
relationships.'
Under O'Hagan, a party can be held liable under the misappropriation theory
whenever information is improperly taken from a source to which a duty of trust
and confidence is owed. In the past, the misappropriation theory has encompassed
a broad spectrum of relationships that imposed liability because some type of
fiduciary duty was found to exist. These relationships included a psychiatrist and
patient," 5 a father and son,' and an employer and employee.' Other courts,
however, found no liability for material, nonpublic information transferred between
family members. 8 Whether or not such a duty exists can only be determined by
the trier of fact, based on the circumstances of each individual case. "
Under O'Hagan, the trier of fact must also determine the liability of remote
tippees. A remote tippee can be defined as anyone who obtains material, nonpublic
information from a tippee beyond the original tip from anyone who owes a duty to
the source of the information.' Under the lower courts' approach, remote tippees
face liability if they trade on information that was originally imparted in breach of
a duty. In Dirks, remote tippees are held liable if they knew or should have known
that there was a breach."' In SEC v. Musella,' the Second Circuit extended this
liability to cases premised on the misappropriation theory of Rule lOb-5 liability.O
The Court in O'Hagan did not discuss this theory of remote tippee liability, and
therefore, by default, it appears to have affirmed the Second Circuit's approach.
Thus, even though the information may pass through many tippees before an
individual trades on it, if that individual knew or should have known that there was
253. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Is Selective Disclosure Now Lawful?, N.Y.L.J., July 31, 1997, at 5.
254. See id. Coffee states:
Under § 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, "an agent who acquires confidential
information in the course of his employment... has a duty... to account for any profits made
by the use of such information, although this does not harm the principal." The breach of this duty
can be described as a "misappropriation," and hence O'Hagans standard for liability can be
triggered.
Id.
255. See United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
256. See United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd on other grounds,
773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985).
257. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981).
258. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 570-71 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
259. See Coffee, supra note 253, at 5 ("The key question should be whether there was a legitimate
expectation of confidentiality from the agent on the part of the principal.").
260. See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING § 4.04(3) (1991).
261. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,660-62 (1983); see also Donald C. Langevoort, The Demise
of Dirks: Shifting Standards for Tipper-Tippee Liability, INSIGMrr, June 1994. at 23 (exploring tipper and
tippie liability by looking at Dirks' progeny).
262. 678 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
263. See id. at 1063.
[Vol. 51:53
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol51/iss1/3
SCOPE OF THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
a breach of a duty when the information was imparted to the first tippee, he faces
liability. Under this ruling, any breach of a duty, not necessarily one that is
confined to the breach of the corporate insider, extends liability. Any time there is
a breach of duty, the information obtained by that breach is tainted and anyone who
trades upon it can be found liable no matter how far removed they are from the
original source.
B. The Problem with the O'Hagan Standard
The misappropriation theory is intended to limit, if not eradicate, trading which
is based on information from which traders can gain no-risk profits in connection
with the purchase and sale of securities.' Under O'Hagan, however, virtually any
relationship could fall under the scrutiny of the trier of fact. This ambiguity is
problematic. If the duty remains unclear, careful investors will be apprehensive
about trading on almost any form of information, thereby retarding the efficiency
and flow of capital to the market. This could undermine the SEC's intention of
protecting free and open trading on the markets. Additionally, this standard is unfair
to market actors who cannot know the extent to which they can trade securities
legally. Further, the traditionally zealous enforcement efforts of the SEC will create
increased litigation since the existence of this duty can only be determined by the
trier of fact.
An additional problem raised by the Court's adoption of the misappropriation
theory is the apparent adoption of the applications of the theory used in the lower
courts. In particular, the approach to remote tippees in the lower courts creates an
unfair burden on those traders. It is both impracticable, as well as often impossible,
for a remote tippee to investigate every piece of information received prior to
trading. Often times, remote tippees are so far removed from the original breach
that they do not understand the potential liability. Without a clear limitation on
remote tippee liability, the market will be stymied because traders are forced to
assume that trading on the information is illegal. As the rule currently stands,
securities trading will be inhibited by this potential for limitless liability.
It appears as though the Court has attempted to provide some guidance by
reemphasizing Congress' safeguard stating that persons can be criminally prosecuted
only if they "willfully" utilized misappropriated information in a securities
transaction.' Although this was a step in the right direction with respect to
protecting market actors, it does not provide sufficient guidance to adequately
forewarn criminal liability. Because the rule is uncertain, a dilemma arises where
a tippee becomes further removed from the tipper making it more difficult for the
tippee to assess whether a duty is owed to the source of the information. Presenting
this safeguard as a means to limit liability does not effectively serve its purpose, as
264. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2209 (1997). The Court in O'Hagan premised
its support of the misappropriation theory on the basis that it would lead to "honest securities markets"
and thus "promote investor confidence." Id. at 2210.
265. See id. at 2214.
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it is virtually impossible for individuals put in this type of position to know whether
or not they are liable because no written definitions on such liability exist.
C. An Illustration of the Problem Under O'Hagan
While the facts of O'Hagan lend themselves to the Court's application of the
misappropriation theory, such an application becomes more difficult in cases where
the duty to the source of the information is more attenuated. Specifically, the
O'Hagan test does not allow an individual to determine if his relationship with the
source of the information will give rise to liability. Additionally, the test appears
to condone limitless potential liability for remote tippees. These two problems
within the misappropriation theory can be illustrated in the following manner.
What if it were not O'Hagan, a lawyer with a clear duty to both his law firm and
law firm's client, who traded on the information? Suppose instead the following fact
pattern: A lawyer comes home after work and says to his wife, "ABC has retained
my law firm in a possible takeover attempt of XYZ, Inc."' The wife finds the
information about XYZ, Inc. to be extremely fascinating, but does not trade on that
information herself because the lawyer tells his wife that it would be wrong to do
so. The next day, the wife sees her daughter and, in passing, tells her that her father
is involved in an impending merger with XYZ, Inc. The wife tells the daughter that
this information is confidential and that she should not trade on or pass along
information about this matter. That same day, the daughter has dinner with her
boyfriend and shares the same information she received from her mother regarding
the possible takeover of XYZ, Inc. She also warns her boyfriend that it would be
wrong to trade securities based on this information. The next morning, the
boyfriend calls his broker to buy 1,000 shares of XYZ, Inc. common stock.
The broker, who has been a friend of the boyfriend for years, knows it is unlike
him to place such a large order and inquires about the reasons behind his purchase.
The boyfriend responds that he has "some definite, some accurate information that
XYZ, Inc. is about to be sold at a substantially higher price than its market
value."' 7 The broker, aware that the boyfriend is dating the daughter of the
lawyer, believes the information to be extremely credible and purchases 11,000
shares for himself and his clients.
The test validated by the Court in O'Hagan places the responsibility of
determining the presence of a fiduciary duty with the trier of fact. If a duty of trust
and confidence is present, the trader in question will be found liable; if the duty is
not present, then there is no liability. Thus, when looking at the aforementioned
hypothetical, the boyfriend's liability under the misappropriation theory would
depend upon whether or not a jury determined that the boyfriend-daughter
relationship was one under which a fiduciary duty arose in the misappropriation
266. This hypothetical, while completely fictional, is based on the facts of United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
267. This quote comes from the Chestman case. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 555. Keith Loeb told
Chestman that he had "some definite, some accurate information' that Waldum was about to be sold at
a 'substantially higher' price than its market value." Id.
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theory context. While few juries are likely to find that a simple boyfriend-girlfriend
relationship gives rise to such a duty, it is impossible to tell from the hypothetical
whether the boyfriend is liable. For example, if the boyfriend were a successful
entrepreneur and the girlfriend regularly came to him for financial advice, then
liability potentially exists. If the daughter regularly trusted the boyfriend with
confidential information, it is possible that a jury could decide that the boyfriend
had breached his duty to the daughter by trading on the information with which he
was entrusted. Conversely, if they were not boyfriend and girlfriend, but rather a
married couple, that fact alone would not necessarily imply a breach of duty.
Marriage is not a sufficient enough basis for finding that a duty exists. If the couple
never discussed the daughter's family business except for that one time, then it is
likely that under the test affirmed in O'Hagan the boyfriend would not be found
liable. As a result of the broad test accepted by the Court in O'Hagan the question
of liability remains unclear.
While the SEC may appreciate the broad nature of this test, its burden on the
investing public is also clear. Under this test, individuals are forced to speculate on
an unknown jury's decision before trading. Not only will they be speculating in the
security itself, but also on their personal freedom. Both the inhibiting effects on the
marketplace as well as Constitutional problems with the unclear criminal standard
are apparent from this example.
Additionally, the decision does not limit liability on remote tippees no matter how
attenuated from the original source they are. By failing to discuss the validity of the
"known or should have known"'' 3 standard within the misappropriation theory
context, the Court appears to have accepted the lower court's test for remote
tippees.' 9 In the lower courts, liability for remote tippees was based on the
original misappropriation from the source of the information. If the information
were misappropriated from its source, any individual who later trades upon that
information can be liable for trading. It does not matter how many individuals pass
the information or how distanced the trader is from the original source, the initial
misappropriation taints all who later trade on it. Not only must a trader risk his
money based upon information from which the source is uncertain, but he must also
attempt to second-guess whether the trier of fact may some day27 determine that
the information came from an individual who breached his duty.
Certainly, information is a valuable commodity in our society and we should not
encourage its theft. But there are other methods of prosecuting the individuals who
misappropriate material, nonpublic information." Prosecuting these individuals
268. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
269. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997). It appears as though the Court
is furthering a number of the circuits' holdings in its application of derivative liability for "corporate
'outsider[s]' in breach of a duty owed not to a trading party, but to the source of the information." Id.
270. An individual can be brought up for section 10(b) liability years after an actual trade and it is
up to the trier of fact to determine the legality of this trade, thereby making any trading where the source
is uncertain a possible crime.
271. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 952 (4th Cir. 1995). The Bryan court stated that there
are a number of federal efforts to combat fraud in the marketplace and that the use of section 10(b)
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under a theory of liability designed to curb insider trading is not appropriate.
Individuals with no connection or duty to the companies in which they trade are not
the corporate insiders Congress intended to target with section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act.'
In our hypothetical, the broker's liability rests on whether he knew or should have
known from the nature of the information that it had been obtained at some point
in time as the result of a breach of duty to the source of the information.
Admittedly, upon further investigation, the broker may have discovered the lawyer's
breach of duty. But in the fast-paced and competitive financial marketplace, where
decisiveness is essential, evaluating whether information received is material,
nonpublic information is not feasible. In the information age, investors are
inundated with information from numerous sources' and thus evaluating its status
under the current standard is not the simple task it was when Rule lOb-5 was
formulated by the SEC. 4 It is not practical to conduct extensive investigations of
every shred of information that crosses a broker's desk. It is important to note that
without investigation, the investor is taking a substantial risk. Taking the time to
investigate the source of the boyfriend's information could easily result in a missed
opportunity, but could also have prevented a financial misstep if the information
were erroneous. Under the O'Hagan standard, both no-risk trading, as well as the
risk-based trading275 upon which the integrity of the market rests, are impeded.
D. A More Appropriate Standard
To deal with the problems resulting from O'Hagan, a test that allows for a
flexible application of the misappropriation theory, while providing clear guidelines
for traders, must be instituted. A more appropriate standard would target risk-free
should be limited to the scope of liability it was intended to reach. See id. The misappropriation theory
is not the sole remedy for inappropriate trading under section 10(b) - the mail and wire fraud statutes
can also be utilized where the misappropriation theory falls short. See id. Additionally, both state law
and common law provide remedies where an action falls outside the reach of §10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
A number of actions can be brought against securities traders to ensure fairness and propriety in the
marketplace. Such actions include "liability for negligence, misappropriation of corporate opportunities
or confidential employment information, theft, burglary, and breach of employment contracts." Michael
Kenny & Teresa Thebaut, Misguided Statutory Construction to Cover the Corporate Universe: The
Misappropriation Theory of Section 10(b), 59 ALB. L. REv. 139, 211 (1995).
272. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
273. See Kerry Hannon, Tip or Tout? The Perils of Buying on the Buzz, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.,
Dec. 9, 1995, at 114.
274. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
275. The riskiness associated with information can be differentiated from the normal risk associated
with trading in the securities marketplace. Normal risk associated in the marketplace can be related to
a stock's beta. Beta measures a stock's volatility relative to an average risk stock, which by definition
has a beta of 1.0. Market risk stems from factors which systematically affect the entire marketplace,
including occurrences such as war, inflation, recessions, and high interest rates. The tendency of an
individual stock to move with the market constitutes a risk because the market tends to fluctuate and
these fluctuations cannot consistently be managed through diversification. See EUGENE BRIGHAM & Lois
GAPENSKI, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT THEORY AND PRACnCE 145-46, 164, 211-12, 468, 570, 629 (8th
ed. 1997).
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trading, but would not inhibit trading that has a factor of risk involved.'7 The
following three-pronged test would build upon the O'Hagan ruling and would both
provide clear guidelines for investors and fight the abuses of insider trading:
(1) An individual who gains access to material, non-public information from the
source with a proprietary right to that information as a consequence of performing
duties for which consideration is or is normally received shall be liable for his own
trades, the trades of the individuals he tips, as well as for the individuals they tip;
or
(2) An individual who intentionally and improperly gains access to material, non-
public information from a party who has a fiduciary obligation to not reveal/make
public that information shall be liable for his own trades, the trades of the
individuals he tips, as well as for the individuals they tip; or
(3) An individual with a traditional fiduciary duty, independent of a duty owed
to the source with a proprietary right in the information, who trades on or
disseminates material, non-public information shall be liable for his own trades, the
trades of the individuals he tips, as well as for the individuals they tip.
The first prong of this proposed rule targets misappropriators like in O'Hagan,
but limits liability only to those who have an assurance as to the accuracy of the
information they received. Under this rule, "gaining access to material nonpublic
information" would mean obtaining, receiving, or otherwise learning of information
in a manner expected by the owner of the information. This would effect both
employees of the company as well as independent contractors outside the company
who have access to information within the company by virtue of the services they
perform. Thus, those who owe a clear duty to the original source may not
misappropriate it. Those who do not gain information in the course of their service
to the source of the information do not face liability.
Proprietary rights are "[t]hose rights which an owner of property has by virtue of
ownership."2" Under O'Hagan, any party who possesses information can be
considered its owner, even if they are not the rightful owner."7 The proposed
requirement would only recognize liability when it came from a "source with a
proprietary right to the information." Information not acquired through formal
means' would not meet this requirement. The rationale is that liability should
only arise when an individual participates in risk-free trading. When obtaining
information from a source other than its rightful owner, a party cannot know
whether that information is accurate or not. If he chooses to trade on that
information, a risk is being taken.
Gaining this information "as a consequence of performing duties for which
consideration is or is normally received" is the next requirement under this prong.
Under O'Hagan, a duty can extend to any relationship. Under the proposed
276. See supra note 275.
277. BLACK'S LAWv DICTIONARY 848 (6th ed. 1990).
278. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207-08 (1997).
279. A company may generate itself, purchase from another, or contract a third party to create the
information in question.
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requirement that consideration is or is normally received for the duties performed,
a clear line of demarcation between those who have a duty and those who do not
is created. Thus, those that receive material, nonpublic information in the course of
performing their duties for an employer or contractor are not free to use that
information for personal gain. Additionally, those who gain access to information
by performing duties for which individuals normally receive consideration will be
included. "Normally" in this definition would be a societal standard rather than one
based on the individual circumstances. Therefore, performance of a service or duty
for which the average, reasonable person would expect to be compensated will meet
this requirement. This prevents a lawyer working pro bono from legally misap-
propriating from his client. At the same time, those who receive information from
parties to which they do not have an economic connection, or one that would not
normally involve an economic benefit, do not face liability. The rationale behind
this distinction is simply that when an individual works for or with a company, he
is generally certain that the information the company imparts to him will be truthful.
He could not do his job properly without that assurance. Those that perform duties
for free have a similar assurance of truthfulness since the individuals they are
helping must still give them accurate information to perform their duties. But
parties who lack this type of connection when sharing information, have no similar
assurance of truthfulness. A party who trades on information received without this
assurance of truthfulness is undertaking a risk when he trades on it.'
Under this standard, an individual is liable for his own trades and the trades of
the people he tips, or the people they subsequently tip. Since liability under
O'Hagan arises from the source of the information, any relationship, no matter how
distant from the original source, can be the basis for liability. The O'Hagan
standard strays from its purpose of preventing risk-free trading. The O'Hagan
standard would find liability for trades made on information of which the trader has
no assurance of accuracy.
Under the proposed prong, liability attaches when the individual falling within the
scope of the rule trades or tips. This requirement places responsibility on a tipper
rather than the tippee. The reason for this distinction is that it makes more sense to
punish the one who improperly communicates than it does to punish one who trades
280. Note that in this rule the person who gives out the information still faces the liability for the
improper communication. The trader who takes a risk will no longer face prosecution.
281. This standard would protect the mutual fund managers, pension fund administrators, and other
institutional investors that come in contact with selective disclosures made by the issuer. Often
companies make such disclosures in order to maintain good working relationships with large institutional
investors. These disclosures are often material and nonpublic. Thus, the institutional investors run a risk
of assuming Rule lOb-5 liability when they trade on this information. This is especially true in situations
where the source of the information is unknown or unclear. This standard will protect these investors
by only holding liable the one who speaks. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, The Supreme
Court Has Upheld the Misappropriation Theory, But How Far the SEC Will Take the Ruling is Anything
But Clear, NAYL L.J., Aug. 4, 1997, at B4 (col. 1) ("[The] legal uncertainties [of the O'Hagan decision]
provide scant comfort to mutual fund managers, pension fund administrators and other institutional
investors, who have little desire to sacrifice their resources and good names to help the SEC frame legal
standards through the enforcement process.").
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on information from an unknown or uncertain source. The original tipper will face
liability if anyone further down that chain trades on information he improperly
imparted. 2 The additional tippees, however, will not face liability, as they are
sufficiently distant from the source of the information. As the source becomes more
attenuated, risk enters into the equation. Since Congress' intention is to limit only
risk-free trades, those further down the chain should not face liability for taking
action that Congress did not intend to limit. This is in accordance with the O'Hagan
rationale of holding people liable for breaching their duty to the source of the
information. However, under the new test, the one who breaches is the one who
will be held liable. This would also serve as a deterrent to those with access to
material, nonpublic information. By holding one liable for tipping under these
circumstances, the integrity of the market will be more secure.
The second prong applies to individuals to whom the source with the proprietary
right in the information did not intend to give access to the information. It would
apply to parties who "intentionally and improperly gain access to material,
nonpublic information" from a source with a proprietary right. This can be
distinguished from intentionally and improperly obtaining the information from a
non-proprietary source. The rationale behind this distinction is that without the
assurance of truthfulness one has when obtaining from a proprietary source,
obtaining from any third party carries sufficient risk to justify freedom from liability
under Rule 1Ob-5.'
Under this prong, the information must be obtained "from a party who has a
fiduciary obligation to not reveal/make public that information." The purpose of this
requirement is to inhibit trading on information that is more likely to be accurate
because of the relationship between the owner and the source. Information that does
not meet this requirement does not carry the same assurance of accuracy as does
information shared between fiduciaries.'
This prong requires the person to trade on the information or to pass it to an
individual who trades. As in prong one, liability attaches when the individual falling
within the scope of the rule trades or tips. Whereas his tippees would not be liable
for their trades, the tipper would face prosecution for each tippee who trades.
The third prong involves those "with a traditional fiduciary duty" to the individual
who shares the material, nonpublic information. This would cover the instance of
a doctor-patient relationship such as that established in Willis' and will not find
a fiduciary duty in a normal family relationship such as that in the Chestman
282. It serves to attach liability to the one who is the original breacher of the material, nonpublic
information. The application of liability to the person with the duty to the proprietary source stemming
from trading by a remote tippee will ultimately create a strong incentive for confidentiality in the face
of information that is not meant to extend beyond the four walls of the proprietary source.
283. Of course, intentionally improperly obtaining information from anon-proprietary source carries
with it other possible causes of action under state law. See supra note 271.
284. There are other causes of action that can be brought against an individual who steals valuable
information from an individual where there is no fiduciary duty. But the securities laws are designed to
combat risk-free trading, not theft of information.
285. United States v. Willis, 778 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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case. This prong brings greater certainty as to which relationships will be
covered by limiting it to only the traditional fiduciary duties' The fiduciaries
have an obligation to keep the information they receive from their clients
confidential.' Unlike the standard in O'Hagan, which allows any relationship to
qualify as a fiduciary relationship, this test would limit these relationships to those
that have been traditionally recognized by the courts. 9
This prong encompasses a duty that is "independent of a duty owed to the source
with a proprietary right to the information." Individuals have a right to seek the
counsel of attorneys, doctors, and priests that are not associated with the companies
for which they work. In order for these professionals to serve their clients properly,
they must have full disclosure of the pertinent facts surrounding the situation of
those who seek their counsel. Such disclosure has traditionally been recognized by
the Court as confidential because without this confidentiality, traditional fiduciaries
would not be able to effectively perform their job.
This prong requires the person to trade on the information or to pass it to an
individual who trades. As in prongs one and two, liability attaches when the
individual falling within the scope of the rule trades or tips. Whereas his tippees
would not be liable for their trades, the tipper would face prosecution for each
tippee who trades.
It is important to note that, under this proposal, tippees do not face derivative
liability. This differs from both the classical theory of liability as well as the current
standard under OHagan. Essentially, derivative liability allows prosecution of
traders rather than those who have tipped them. This proposal to change that is
based upon two rationales. First, unlike classical insider trading, individuals
prosecuted under the misappropriation theory are corporate outsiders. The basis for
derivative liability in the classical theory is that the responsibility of the tipper to
the shareholders is imputed to the tippees. The misappropriation theory addresses
outsiders who have no obligation to the shareholders of the corporation whose stock
is being traded. It seems illogical to impute a duty to a tippee when the tipper of
the information did not have.a duty to the shareholders of the company whose
securities were traded in the first place. Second, by placing liability on the tipper's
shoulders, this rule would provide strong motivation for individuals who have access
to material, nonpublic information not to reveal it to others. By encouraging
individuals not to share information, there is less likelihood that risk-free trades will
occur in the marketplace. If the SEC were to "look who's talking" when assessing
liability, they would have greater success in their efforts to maintain the integrity
in the securities marketplace.
286. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
287. Examples of traditional fiduciaries include those relations existing between attorney and client,
principal and agent, and executor and heir. It is the highest standard of duty implied by law. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 625-26 (6th ed. 1990).
288. Courts already recognize these traditional fiduciary duties as confidential relationships.
289. See GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EvIDENCE § 9.1 (3rd ed. 1996).
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Satisfying any one of these prongs would be sufficient to find a Rule lOb-5
violation for each improper trade. If a trade results from a tip that satisfies more
than one prong of this test, the tipper in question will only face one Rule lOb-5
liability cause of action. The prongs of this test are not meant to give cumulative
causes of action. Rather, this test simply delineates all appropriate means of finding
liability under the misappropriation theory.
E. Application of the New Standard
Returning to our original hypothetical,' the liability of the parties is now clear.
Applying the three-prong test to the lawyer, we can see that the lawyer "has gained
access to material, nonpublic information." As a lawyer representing a client,
learning about the client's situation is both expected and appropriate. In a situation
where a client retains a law firm, any information imparted to one lawyer in the
firm is imputed to all lawyers. 91 Even if the lawyer were not directly involved
with the representation of the client, he would still meet this requirement.
Next, we must determine if he gained this information "as a consequence of
performing duties for which consideration is or is normally received." An attorney
representing a client would meet this test. Even if the firm's representation had been
pro bono, this would be sufficient to meet this test since it is the type of service for
which consideration is normally received. Similarly, as above, even if a lawyer is
not directly involved in the representation of the client, just as the information the
client imparts is imputed to the firm, so too would be the funds paid to the firm.
The attorneys representing ABC require accurate information to fulfill their duties
to their clients, therefore there is an expectation that the information they receive
from their client will be accurate.
To find liability, the information must be received "from the source with a
proprietary right to that information." The lawyer's law firm obtained this information
from ABC, which is the information's rightful owner. Thus this information came
from a source with a proprietary right. Again, by obtaining information from the
rightful owner, the lawyer has a strong assurance that the information is accurate.
Based on the test to this point, we can see that the lawyer has obtained accurate
information from the owner of said information in the course of performing his
duties for the information's owner. In this situation, trading on this information
would be risk-free and therefore, trading on it would compromise the integrity of
the market.
Therefore, the lawyer "shall be liable for his own trades, the trades of the
individuals he tips, as well as for the individuals they tip." In the hypothetical, the
lawyer did not trade himself, nor did his wife, who he directly tipped, trade on the
information. The boyfriend and the broker, however, both traded on the information
and both of these remote tippees can be linked back to the lawyer's tip. As
290. See supra notes 266-67 and accompanying text.
291. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.10(a) (1983); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY DR 5-105(d) (1980). The rule cited here is the imputed disqualification
rule and is cited for analogy.
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discussed below, the boyfriend and the broker undertook trades that had a
significant element of risk and should not face liability. The lawyer, however, by
tipping information that he knew was accurate does face liability for the trades of
the boyfriend and the broker. This is because his action compromises the integrity
of the market. For this reason, anyone that releases material, nonpublic information
with an assurance of accuracy, under this test, should be liable for the damage they
cause the securities marketplace. By satisfying the first prong of this test, the lawyer
has met the standard for liability and thus would be in violation for both the trades
of the boyfriend and the broker.
By validating the misappropriation theory, the O'Hagan Court appears to have
accepted the lower courts' holdings that a variety of relationships can be the basis
for liability.' In the proposed test, those relationships from which liability can
stem are clear. In the hypothetical, the boyfriend fails the first prong because he is
not performing duties. In the way the hypothetical is presented, the boyfriend would
also fail the second prong because he did not improperly obtain the material
nonpublic information. If the facts were different, however, the boyfriend could face
liability under the second prong. Consider this change in facts: Instead of receiving
the information freely from the daughter, what if the boyfriend were having dinner
with the daughter at the lawyer's home. If, during the meal, he excused himself,
went upstairs, and looked through the father's briefcase and discovered this
information, then the boyfriend would face liability under the second prong.
An individual under the second prong faces liability when they gain access to and
misappropriate material, nonpublic information. Sneaking off and opening the
lawyer's briefcase is both intentional and improper. Neither the source with the
proprietary right in the information, nor the lawyer, intended for the boyfriend to
access the information in this manner. By stealing information, the boyfriend
rightfully faces liability under Rule 1Ob-5.' 3
This information was obtained from "a party who has a fiduciary obligation to
not reveal/make public that information." A lawyer has a fiduciary duty to his
clients not to reveal the information told to him in confidence. The fiduciary duty
under prong two would extend beyond the traditional fiduciary duties that are the
focus of prong three. Under prong two, anyone taking information from someone
with a duty to maintain a confidential relationship could face liability. While this
would recognize the broader definition of when a duty is owed, like the duties
recognized in O'Hagan, this broader concept of duty is only appropriate when there
is an intentional and improper taking of the information. The reason for this
292. The Supreme Court's affirmation of the misappropriation theory serves as an implied
affirmation of the lower court's holdings dealing with this issue.
293. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Rule lOb-5 of the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5(b) (1997), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce or of the mails or of any national securities exchange.. .to engage in
any act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
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distinction is the fact that the individual is purposefully committing a wrongful act
and therefore a stricter standard should apply.
Under prong two, the party is liable for "his own trades, the trades of the
individuals he tips, as well as for the individuals they tip." Again, under this test,
the individual who either trades on or releases accurate material, nonpublic
information causes damage to the securities marketplace and thereby should be
liable for his trades, the trades of those he tips, or one of their tippees. Tippees
further down the chain do not face liability because of the risk involved in their
trading. 5 They do not have the same assurance of accuracy, as does the
boyfriend. The boyfriend is the only one who knows that trading on the information
is risk-free.
The broker in the hypothetical would fail to meet the standard in the third prong
of the proposed test. This is because he is not an individual with a traditional
fiduciary duty to the source of the information, which, in this case, would be the
boyfriend. If the facts were different however, and the broker was a psychiatrist,
the result would be different. Had the boyfriend gone to the psychiatrist for help
and in the course of the professional relationship told the psychiatrist he felt guilty
for stealing the information, and then the psychiatrist traded on the information, the
psychiatrist would face liability under the third prong. This third prong is designed
to prevent those who have a legal obligation to act for the benefit of another from
misappropriating information they learn within the scope of their fiduciary
relationship.
The psychiatrist would meet the test of "an individual with a traditional fiduciary
duty." A fiduciary duty "is the highest standard of duty implied by law."2' In a
fiduciary relationship, both the principal expects and the fiduciary represents that
the communications made within that relationship will remain confidential. For
example, the rules of evidence recognize that the benefit to society of keeping these
communications confidential outweighs the loss of making these communications
undiscoverable. The proposed test recognizes the benefits to society of fiduciary
relationships and punishes those who take advantage of confidential communications
within this context. Further, communications within fiduciary relationships have a
strong assurance of accuracy since the party in a position of trust is expected to
maintain the confidences of the relationship. Thus, a misappropriating fiduciary
realizes that trading on the information received within the fiduciary relationship is
risk-free trading. A psychiatrist cannot do his job without obtaining truthful
294. The Court also recognizes that a higher standard is needed because there is criminal liability
involved. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2214. The Court applies the stricter scienter standard and therefore,
by analogy, willfully committing a wrongful act would also require a stricter standard. Id.; see also supra
note 265 and accompanying text (discussing safeguards for criminal liability the Court emphasized in
O'Hagan decision).
295. The further removed one is from the source, the more risk associated with trading. The source
from which the information came cannot be determined. Additionally, there is doubt with respect to
accuracy, and therefore, there is a significant amount or risk involved.
296. See supra note 287.
297. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 432 (6th ed. 1990).
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information from his patient. By trading on this information, the psychiatrist has
breached his obligation to his patient and should face liability for this breach.
This traditional fiduciary duty is "independent of a duty owed to the source with
a proprietary right in the information." In the hypothetical, the boyfriend would not
have a duty to the law firm from which he stole the information. That, however, is
not relevant when a traditional fiduciary duty (psychiatrist-patient) is being
breached. Since the confidential nature of fiduciary relationships assures accuracy
of information, trades resulting from breaches of this duty threaten the integrity of
the marketplace. By virtue of his duty to the boyfriend, the psychiatrist has gained
access to information, which he knows to be accurate and then traded upon it. Even
though the boyfriend did not have a proprietary right in the information, within the
context of the fiduciary relationship there is sufficient assurance of accuracy such
that trading on this type of information is inappropriate.
The traditional fiduciary is liable for "his own trades, the trades of the individuals
he tips, as well as for the individuals they tip." Under the third prong, once again,
the individual who either trades on or releases accurate material, nonpublic
information causes damage to the securities marketplace and thereby should be
liable for his trades, the trades of those he tips, or the trades of their tippees. The
psychiatrist, knowing that the information is accurate as a result of its source,
should be liable and no other trader would face derivative liability.
Even though the mother and daughter are both tippers, they do not face liability.
The obligation is on the lawyer and not the person who he tips. Neither the mother
nor the daughter breached a traditional fiduciary obligation or a fiduciary duty owed
to the proprietary source of the information. The one who breaches the duty is
liable for any and all trades of any person he tips or any person tipped because of
his breach.
Under the new standard, the relationships that give rise to liability are clear.
Individuals will know when they are acting appropriately and when they are not
acting appropriately, and will be able to regulate their trades accordingly.
Additionally, the new standard places the burden of liability on the tipper rather
than the tippee. This should provide a strong motivation to prevent the release of
material, nonpublic information into the marketplace. Thus, the standard ac-
complishes both the goal of making criminal liability clear and deterring the release
of material nonpublic information in the marketplace. By clearing up liability under
the misappropriation theory, this standard would better serve the SEC in its efforts
to prevent risk-free trading in the securities arena.
VI. Conclusion
Liability under the misappropriation theory is designed to prevent fraud in the
securities marketplace. The misappropriation theory, however, is not meant to
govern the "corporate universe."" There are many other state actions which cover
the crimes to which the lower courts have applied the misappropriation theory. By
298. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
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expanding the misappropriation theory to an indefinite scope, it circumvents the
purpose of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Worse, it makes criminal liability
unpredictable, which contravenes the protections afforded under the Constitution.
The new proposed test should bring certainty to an uncertain rule. By clearly
delineating criminal liability, individuals can regulate their behavior accordingly.
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